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We propose a state space modelling approach for decomposing high frequency trading volume 
into liquidity-driven and information-driven components. Based on a set of high frequency 
S&P 500 stocks data, we show that informed trading increases pricing efficiency by reducing 
volatility, illiquidity and toxicity/adverse selection during periods of non-aggressive trading. 
We also find that our estimated informed trading component of volume is a statistically 
significant predictor for one-second stock returns, but is not a significant predictor for one-
minute stock returns; this disparity is explained by high frequency trading activity, which leads 
to the elimination of pricing inefficiencies at high frequencies. 
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Market participants’ trades are driven by either information or the search for liquidity 
(see Admati & Pfleiderer 1988). Liquidity traders do not trade on the basis of any specific 
information; their trading strategies are therefore not directly related to future payoffs. The 
trading strategies of informed traders, on the other hand, are based on private information and 
are directly related to future payoffs. The activities of these two fundamental types of traders 
have been extensively analysed in seminal papers in the larger financial markets literature and 
more so in the market microstructure literature (see as examples Glosten & Milgrom 1985; 
Kyle 1985; Collin-Dufresne & Fos 2016). For example, Kyle (1985) predicts that the volatility 
of asset prices partially reflects inside information (informed trading) and is independent of 
liquidity-driven trading effects, while Glosten and Milgrom (1985) predict that the breadth of 
the bid-ask spread is primarily driven by informed trading, which incorporates adverse 
selection costs into the spread. In both models, it is assumed that traders execute their trading 
strategies by using marker orders; thus, all traders trade aggressively in both models. More 
recently however, Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016) extend Kyle's (1985) model and show that 
the relationship between stock price volatility and informed trading depends on the 
aggressiveness of traders. Furthermore, in contrast to Glosten and Milgrom's (1985) model, 
Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016) predict that informed trading may be negatively correlated 
with adverse selection if informed traders execute their strategies using limit orders.  Using a 
comprehensive sample of trades from Schedule 13D filings by activist investors, Collin-
Dufresne and Fos (2015) show that informed traders with long-lived information tend to use 
limit orders, which leads to a negative correlation between adverse selection and informed 
trading (see also Kaniel & Liu 2006).  
This paper builds on the above predictions and findings. We first develop a general 
state space-based methodology for decomposing trading volume into liquidity-driven and 
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information-driven components. Specifically, we demonstrate that observable percentage 
change in trading volume is a sum of two unobserved series: a nonstationary series (expected 
component) and a stationary series (unexpected component). We argue that the expected 
component of trading volume is mainly driven by liquidity traders, whereas the unexpected 
component is primarily driven by informed traders. Our argument is anchored on two reasons. 
Firstly, the expected component in the state space model is a nonstationary series and follows 
a random walk. Consistent with the literature, it is reasonable to argue that liquidity traders 
trade randomly (i.e. the reference to noise trading in the market microstructure literature), and 
thus we model the trading volume of liquidity traders as a random walk (see as examples Kyle 
1985; Admati & Pfleiderer 1988). Secondly, in state space models, changes in the expected 
component affect the observable variable permanently, while changes in the unexpected 
component have a transitory impact on the observable variable, in this case, trading volume 
(see Hendershott & Menkveld 2014). 
Secondly, using the estimated expected and unexpected components of trading volume, 
we examine the role of liquidity and informed traders on market quality metrics, such as 
volatility, liquidity and toxicity. This part of our analysis serves two purposes, by being a joint 
test of the empirical relevance of our state space model and the impact of different traders on 
market quality. The relevance of our state space approach is examined by relating our empirical 
findings to model predictions in the existing relevant theoretical market microstructure 
literature. 
Thirdly, we examine the predictive power of the estimated information-
driven/unexpected component of trading volume on short-horizon returns. This analysis 
furthers our aim of demonstrating the relevance of the state space approach to decomposing 
trading volume into informed and liquidity components. It is also a direct test of the efficiency 
of the price discovery process (see Chordia et al. 2005, 2008). Similar to order imbalance 
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metrics employed in Chordia et al. (2008), the unexpected component also signals private 
information, and we expect it to be a predictor of short-horizon returns. 
Our results are generally consistent with our expectations. Based on our state space-
estimated information and liquidity-driven components of trading volume, we find that stock 
price volatility is independent of liquidity trading, but impacted by information-motivated 
trading (see Glosten & Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985). We also find that information-motivated 
trading volume improves pricing efficiency by reducing price volatility and market toxicity, 
and improving liquidity; the results are robust to alternative estimation frequencies, and 
volatility and liquidity proxies. This finding is in line with the theoretical model developed by 
Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016), which predicts that the price volatility-informed trading 
relationship is influenced by two effects. On the one hand, informed trading reveals 
information, and this decreases uncertainty in financial markets, which reduces price volatility. 
On the other hand, the aggressive behaviour of informed traders could increase volatility. Thus, 
the net impact of informed trading on stock price volatility depends on which effect dominates. 
Thus, our finding in relation to volatility is linked to the period of relative calm in S&P 500 
stocks, which we examine. Furthermore, Menkveld (2013) shows that aggressive trading is not 
profitable during normal trading periods, i.e. trading periods are considered normal if there is 
no excessive aggressiveness, such as a flash crash. This implies that informed traders do not 
tend to use aggressive orders during periods of relative calm in financial markets; thus, their 
activities could lead to a reduction of volatility in the markets, as predicted by Collin-Dufresne 
and Fos (2016). The results are also consistent with the findings of Avramov et al. (2006) and 
Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015), who find that price volatility and adverse selection are 
negatively correlated with informed trading. The negative relationships of informed trading 
with order flow toxicity and illiquidity are linked to informed traders’ use of limit orders rather 
than (aggressive) market orders. In a large part of the market microstructure literature, it is 
generally assumed that informed traders use only market orders, and therefore it is expected 
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that informed traders increase aggressiveness and widen the bid-ask spread, a proxy for 
illiquidity and, by extension one of its components, adverse selection (or its high frequency 
equivalent, market toxicity). However, Kaniel and Liu (2006), modifying Glosten and 
Milgrom's (1985) model, demonstrate that if there is a high probability that the information to 
be exploited is long-lived, then informed traders tend to submit limit orders. The prediction of 
Kaniel and Liu's (2006) model is empirically confirmed by Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015), 
who find that informed traders with long-lived information tend to use limit orders, which leads 
to a reduction in adverse selection.1 
Finally, we find that information-motivated trading is a significant predictor of one-
second stock returns. It implies that although financial markets are efficient in the long-term, 
there are short-term inefficiencies in markets because investors need time to absorb new 
information (see Chordia et al. 2008). However, we find that the horizon for short-term stock 
returns predictability has decreased substantially since the five-minute window reported by 
Chordia et al. (2008). We find that the predictability of short-horizon returns only holds on a 
per second basis, and no longer at the minutes-long threshold reported in earlier studies. This 
is linked to the impact of high frequency trading activity. 
A few streams of the literature are related to this study. There are those studies 
delineating traders into liquidity-driven and information-driven traders (see as an example 
Avramov et al. 2006), and another, extensive, stream examining the role of the different types 
of traders on price volatility and liquidity (see as examples Daigler & Wiley 1999; Avramov 
et al. 2006; Van Ness et al. 2016). This current paper differs from these studies in several 
aspects. Firstly, the approach we present is fundamentally different to those employed in the 
existing studies. Secondly, we generally examine the role of informed trading activity in the 
evolution of specific market quality metrics, including a new proxy, market toxicity – a role 
                                                      
1 The rational expectation model developed by Wang (1993) also predicts a negative correlation between informed 
trading and stock price volatility, but via a different mechanism. Furthermore, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) also 
argue in favour of a negative relationship between adverse selection and informed trading. 
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not well documented in the literature. Finally, we present new evidence on the speed of price 
adjustment in financial markets. 
 
2. Theory and the previous literature 
In this paper, we decompose trading volume into liquidity and information-driven 
components, and thereafter test the empirical relevance of our model and the role of liquidity 
and informed traders in the price discovery process. Our empirical analysis is based on the 
predictions of widely accepted theories as proposed in existing studies. Thus, this paper is 
related to the stream of literature investigating the impact of asymmetric information on asset 
prices’ volatility and liquidity. Kyle (1985) presents one of the first and best-established models 
deriving equilibrium security prices when traders possess asymmetric information. The model 
assumes three types of traders in a market: a market maker, a noise trader that trades randomly, 
and an informed trader, and also provides a framework for determining the price impact of 
trading volume. The model shows that stock price volatility partially reflects inside 
information, which is independent of noise trading volatility. Furthermore, the model predicts 
that informed traders trade more actively when there is a higher level of noise trading volume 
in the markets, because the higher uninformed trading volume provides a “camouflage” for 
informed order flow. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model the bid-ask spread and propose a then 
new explanation on why it arises in financial markets. The model predicts that adverse selection 
implies that the market maker makes losses whenever trading with insiders, and hence she is 
forced to impose different charges on buy and sell volumes in order to compensate for her 
potential losses. In other words, the model predicts that the bid-ask spread depends on informed 
trading activity and the independence of liquidity traders. Moreover, the model predicts that 
the higher the variance of prices, the greater the impact of insiders/informed traders on the bid-
ask spread. Consistent with Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O'Hara (1987) also 
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suggest that stock illiquidity should increase in the presence of informed traders, as information 
asymmetry increases adverse selection, which widens the spread.  
In both Kyle's (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom's (1985) models, the liquidity traders 
trade randomly. By contrast, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) argue that this is a strong 
assumption and it might be more reasonable to assume that at least some liquidity traders can 
select the timing of their transactions. Consistent with the literature, this model predicts that 
the information-motivated trades increase as liquidity driven trading volumes rise, and the 
variance of price changes is independent of the variance of liquidity traders.   However, 
surprisingly, the theoretical framework predicts that adverse selection decreases the number of 
informed traders. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) argue that informed traders in possession of 
the same set of information will compete, and that this competition reduces adverse selection 
and increases benefits to liquidity traders.   
As already noted, generally, theoretical models examining information asymmetry in 
the price discovery process assume that informed traders execute their trading strategies by 
using market orders, i.e. they are aggressive traders (see as examples Glosten & Milgrom 1985; 
Kyle 1985). Popular models such as the probability of informed trading (PIN) model, 
developed by Easley et al. (1996) and Easley et al. (1997), also make this assumption. In 
contrast to these models, Kaniel and Liu (2006) argues that the assumption is unnecessarily 
strong. By extending the Glosten and Milgrom's (1985) model, the authors show that informed 
traders with long lived information strategically tend to use limit orders instead of market 
orders (see also Sun & Ibikunle 2016). Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016) also extend Kyle's 
(1985) model of insider trading and show that the impact of informed trading on the price 
discovery process is two-fold and could be explained by two mechanisms. Firstly, informed 
traders reveal information, which decreases the level of price uncertainty in the market; thus, 
stock price volatility is negatively correlated with informed trading. Secondly, informed traders 
could trade aggressively, and this aggressive behaviour increases stock price volatility in 
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financial markets; hence, stock price volatility is positively correlated with informed traders. 
Therefore, the relationship between market quality characteristics, such as price volatility, and 
informed traders depends on which effect dominates the other. The majority of market 
microstructure models predict positive correlations between informed trading and stock price 
volatility because they assume that informed traders will aim to quickly take advantage of 
private information by seeking to execute market orders based on such information. However, 
Menkveld (2013) and Rzayev and Ibikunle (2017) show that aggressive trading is not profitable 
for informed traders if there is no widespread aggression in the market. This implies that during 
calmer periods, we would expect to see a negative relationship between informed trading 
volume and stock price volatility (see also Kaniel & Liu 2006; Collin-Dufresne & Fos 2015). 
The negative informed trading-price volatility relationship is also predicted by rational 
expectations models (see as examples Hellwig 1980; Wang 1993).  
While the relationship between informed trading volume and price volatility is nuanced, 
a positive relationship between aggregate trading volume, i.e. containing informed and 
uninformed volume, and stock price volatility, is widely documented (see as an example the 
studies summarized in Karpoff 1987). Generally, the impact of trading volume on stock price 
volatility is explained by some related theories. We mainly focus on two well-known and 
widely accepted theories: information theories and dispersion of beliefs theories. Information 
theories, such as a mixture of distributions models and sequential arrival of information models, 
suggest that both volatility and volume are determined by information arrivals (see Copeland 
1976; Epps & Epps 1976; Copeland 1977). The dispersion of beliefs theory, modelled by Harris 
and Raviv (1993) and Shalen (1993), argues that both unusual volume and volatility are 
associated with the differences in traders’ beliefs. To put it simply, the dispersion of beliefs 
model/theory incorporates the role of different types of traders into the relationship between 
trading volume and stock price volatility.  
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In most existing studies, trading activity is measured by total trading volume. However, 
as already noted, the dispersion of beliefs models argue that this relationship depends on the 
differences in traders’ beliefs, and thus linking volatility to total trading volume conceals some 
important information (see also Chordia et al. 2002). Therefore, some studies decompose 
trading volume into its components and then examine the role of different trading components 
on market quality characteristics, such as stock price volatility and market liquidity (see as 
examples Bessembinder & Seguin 1993; Daigler & Wiley 1999; Avramov et al. 2006).  
Avramov et al. (2006) partition trades into two components: herding (non-informed) and 
contrarian (informed) trades. Consistent with the rational expectation models, Avramov et al. 
(2006) find that herding trades increase stock price volatility, however contrarian trades reduce 
it. Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015) directly examine the role of informed traders in the pricing 
process by using a comprehensive sample of trades from Schedule 13D filings by activist 
investors, and conclude that when informed traders can select when (they could strategically 
trade when noise trading is high) and how (they might strategically select to use limit orders) 
to trade, their trading activity decreases adverse selection in financial markets.  
We extend this study to examine the effects of informed trading on market toxicity, and 
then relate it to Van Ness et al. (2016). Van Ness et al. (2016) investigate the role of high 
frequency traders (HFTs) in order flow toxicity by employing the Easley et al. (2011, 2012) 
volume-synchronized probability of informed trading (VPIN) metric as a measure of order flow 
toxicity. Their study finds a negative correlation between HFT activity and order flow toxicity. 
It indicates that, as HFT increases, average order flow toxicity decreases. Furthermore, the 
authors observe a negative correlation between trading volume and order flow toxicity; 
specifically, as volume increases, average market toxicity decreases.  
Finally, our approach for decomposing trading volume into informed and uninformed 
components is based on state space modelling; therefore, our paper is also related to yet another 
stream of the market microstructure literature, which employs state space models. Generally, 
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the existing body of literature on market microstructure uses state space modelling only for 
decomposing price into two components (see as examples Menkveld et al. 2007; Brogaard et 
al. 2014; Hendershott & Menkveld 2014) rather than volume. Menkveld et al. (2007) use the 
approach to analyse around-the-clock price discovery for cross-listed stocks in the Amsterdam 
exchange and NYSE. Their study finds that NYSE plays a minor role in the price discovery 
process for Dutch stocks. Similar to Menkveld et al. (2007), Brogaard et al. (2014) use a state 
space model in order to analyse the price discovery process in the US market. More precisely, 
they examine the role of high frequency trading (HFT) in the price discovery process. The 
study reports a positive role for HFT in the price discovery process. Durbin and Koopman 
(2012) provide a more detailed discussion on the advantages of state space models. 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data 
The data employed consists of ultra-high frequency tick-by-tick data for the most active 
100 S&P 500 stocks sourced from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database. 
Appendix B lists the stocks that are examined. The data spans October 2016 – September 2017. 
In the data, each message is recorded with a time stamp to the nearest millisecond. The 
following variables are included in the dataset: Reuters Identification Code (RIC), date, 
timestamp, price, volume, bid price, ask price, bid volume, and ask volume. We then follow 
Chordia et al. (2001) and Ibikunle (2015) in applying a standard set of exclusion criteria to the 
data, with the aim of excluding inexplicable values that may arise due to erroneous data entries. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of trading activities for the final sample of 
stocks.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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In order to classify trades as buyer- or seller-initiated, we apply the Lee and Ready 
(1991) algorithm.2 Going by the number of transactions and nominal and dollar-denominated 
trading volume, the sell side appears marginally more active than the buy side over the sample 
period. This view is further underscored by the average trade sizes for both buys and sells. The 
sellers also appear more aggressive, based on the average sizes of their trades. 
 
3.2 Main Variables 
A key aim of this study is to examine the role of informed and liquidity traders in the 
evolution of price volatility, liquidity and market toxicity. This inevitably translates into a joint 
test of the empirical relevance of the state space model we employ, as well as the impact of the 
different types of traders on several market quality metrics. Specifically, we build a set of 
predictive regressions to test the impact of expected and unexpected components of traded 
volume on price volatility, liquidity and market toxicity. Thus, our volatility, liquidity and 
market toxicity measures are the main variables of interest. 
Consistent with the literature, we use absolute price changes to measure stock price 
volatility. For robustness, we also use the standard deviation of stock returns (see as examples 
Karpoff 1987; Lamoureux & Lastrapes 1990) as a proxy for stock price volatility. Absolute 
price change is defined as the absolute value of the differences between prices at time t and t-
1, and we use one-second intervals for computing the absolute price changes. To compute the 
standard deviation of stock returns, firstly we employ the midpoint of the bid and ask quotes 
corresponding to every transaction.3 For robustness, we also compute the standard deviation of 
stock returns by computing the returns from the execution price for each transaction rather than 
the midpoint of the prevailing quotes. 
                                                      
2 Chakrabarty et al. (2015) compare the different trades classification methods and conclude that Lee and Ready's 
(1991) is the most accurate method. 
3 Chordia et al. (2008) and Avramov et al. (2006) employ midpoint returns to reduce bid-ask bounce. 
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For robustness, we employ three spread measures as proxies for liquidity; the spread 
metrics are effective spread, quoted spread, and relative spread. The relative and quoted spread 
measures are computed using the best bid and ask prices for each interval, t, which corresponds 
to one second.4 The relative bid-ask spread is obtained by dividing the difference between ask 
and bid prices by the midpoint of both prices, while the quoted spread is simply the difference 
between the ask and bid prices. The effective spread is twice the absolute value of the difference 
between the last transaction price in an interval, t, which corresponds to one second, and the 
midpoint of the prevailing bid and ask prices. 
We use the order imbalance (OIB#) metric proposed by Chordia et al. (2008) as a proxy 
for the level of order toxicity in the market. This is because existing order toxicity measures, 
such as the volume synchronised probability of informed trading (VPIN – see Easley et al. 
2012), essentially capture the essence of order imbalance in the market and thus are highly 
correlated with OIB#. OIB# is computed as the absolute value of the number of buyer-initiated 
trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades divided by the total number of trades during 
the interval, t. In this case, t equals one minute rather than one second. We employ the one-
minute interval to compute market toxicity, because it is challenging to obtain enough trading 
volume for the lower volume stocks to compute unbiased order imbalance metrics within a 
one-second interval.5 
Apart from the main variables discussed above, there are a few other variables that are 
critical to our analysis. In our state space model, trading volume change is an observable 
variable, which is decomposed into two unobservable variables – the 
expected/uninformed/liquidity and unexpected/informed components. Thus, the unexpected 
and expected components should be mechanically correlated with trading activity and volume. 
This implies that we need to include at least one proxy for trading volume and activity in our 
                                                      
4 For robustness, we also employ the last bid and ask quotes for each interval. 
5 For robustness and consistency, we also employ the one-minute estimation interval for price volatility and bid-
ask spread models; the results are presented in Appendix A. 
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secondary models to control for volume. To this end, we employ the percentage change in 
trading volume as the first and main control for trading volume, since the state space-estimated 
components are driven changes in trading volume (see also Chordia et al. 2002).6 Our second 
proxy is the absolute value of buyer-less seller-initiated trades, which should adequately proxy 
trading activity because of Chordia et al. (2002)’s argument that the metric should strongly 
affect prices and liquidity (see also Collin-Dufresne & Fos 2015).7 Table 2 presents summary 
statistics associated with our variables.8  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for measures of liquidity, volatility, toxicity 
and return used in this study. The average effective, relative and quoted spreads are about 
0.009, 0.0004 and 0.018, respectively. Average returns are weakly negative from October 2016 
to September 2017. The mean and median for the absolute price change are about 0.0092 and 
0.009 respectively. The average percentage changes in trading volume is positive at 28.22; 
hence, trading volume increases during our sample period. The average market toxicity metric 
(order imbalance developed by Chordia et al. 2008) is high at 0.54067, since it is computed 
over one-minute intervals. 
 
 
3.3  State Space Model 
Transactions in financial markets are motivated either by liquidity or information (see 
Admati & Pfleiderer 1988). As predicted by the theoretical models of Kyle (1985) and Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985), liquidity and informed order flows have different impacts on price 
changes and the bid-ask spread (see also Wang 1993; Collin-Dufresne & Fos 2016). Avramov 
et al. (2006) empirically measure the relative impact of informed and liquidity traders on 
                                                      
6 For robustness, we also use the natural logarithm of trading volume as a proxy for trading activities and obtain 
completely consistent results. 
7 The correlation between these two proxies is very low. 
8 Descriptive statistics for expected and unexpected components are provided in Section 4.  
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financial instruments and document the different impacts of these traders (see also Collin-
Dufresne & Fos 2015). In this paper, we aim to disentangle liquidity and informed trading 
volume and examine their relative impacts on price volatility, liquidity and market toxicity, 
using the state space approach. State space models are a natural tool for modelling an observed 
variable as the sum of two unobserved variables (see Hendershott & Menkveld 2014). Thus, 
our approach involves showing observable, high-frequency percentage changes in trading 
volume series as the sum of an unobservable nonstationary series (the expected component) 
and stationary series (the unexpected component). We argue that the expected component is 
primarily driven by liquidity trades and the unexpected component is mainly driven by 
information-motivated trades.   
The expected component is mainly driven by liquidity traders, for the following 
reasons. Firstly, consistent with the literature, liquidity-motivated traders trade randomly (see 
as examples Glosten & Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985). In state space representation, the expected 
component is modelled as a random walk, and hence it is reasonable to argue that liquidity 
traders drive the expected component, since if the random walk holds, all available information 
would have been incorporated into stock prices. Secondly, market makers are considered as 
liquidity-motivated traders since they are responsible for the provision of liquidity in financial 
markets. Large, institutional traders, whose trades are typically motivated by liquidity 
requirements, are usually designated as market makers, with obligations to provide liquidity 
when there are liquidity constraints. Thus, some liquidity traders should be a permanent feature 
in the market. Furthermore, Menkveld (2013) shows that the profit of market makers comes 
from the bid-ask spread. Therefore, they need to trade consistently to obtain and increase their 
profits; it again indicates that some liquidity traders are permanent players in financial markets 
and suggests that any change in the structure of designed market makers will have a permanent 
impact on trading volume. According to the structure of the state space model, only the changes 
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in the expected component affect the observable variable permanently, and therefore we can 
again argue that this component is driven by liquidity traders.  
Similarly, information-motivated traders drive the unexpected component of trading 
volume, for the two reasons. Firstly, the information arrival process is an ‘unexpected’ process, 
and hence simple intuition suggests that information-motivated traders should be modelled as 
an unexpected component. Secondly, according to Chordia et al. (2002), private information 
should impact liquidity temporarily in financial markets.9 Thus, any changes in the 
information-driven component of trading volume, while effecting a durable impact on price, 
should affect trading volume temporarily, and thus in state space models, the unexpected 
component has a transitory impact on the observable trading volume variable (see Hendershott 
& Menkveld 2014).  
We model percentage changes in trading volume as a sum of a non-stationary expected 
(liquidity-driven) component and a stationary unexpected (information-driven) component. In 
its simplest form, the structure of the state space model for the percentage changes in trading 
volume can be expressed as: 
                                             ititit smv                                                                   (1) 
and 
                                                      ititit umm  1                                                                (2) 
where 










v                                                             (3) 
itTVolume is a trading volume of stock i at time t, 1itTVolume  is a trading volume of stock i 
at time t-1, itm is a non-stationary expected component of stock i at time t, its  is a stationary 
                                                      
9 Although information is a permanent component of stock prices (see Menkveld et al. 2007), it has a temporary 
impact on trading volume. The reason is that, according to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), any new 
information is simultaneously absorbed by traders and hence, it can only cause transitory (short-term) changes in 
trading volume (see Fama 1970). 
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unexpected component of stock i at time t and 
itu is an idiosyncratic disturbance error. its and itu
are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated and normally distributed. Time, t, equals one-second 
in the main estimations; however, we also employ one-minute interval analysis for 
robustness.10 The structure of the model shows that only changes on itu affect the changes in 
trading volume permanently; its is temporary because it affects trading volume changes only at 
a particular time. By using maximum likelihood (likelihood is constructed using the Kalman 
filter), we can easily estimate uit
2 and sit
2 . According to the structure of our state space model, 
any changes in the expected component of trading volume are sourced by changes in one 
fraction of the market, which is populated by liquidity traders; any changes in the other fraction 
of market, which is controlled by informed traders, should reflect the changes in the unexpected 
components. It implies that our estimations ( uit
2 and sit
2 ) can be used as proxies for the two 
fractions of the market’s trading volume, i.e. uit
2 is a proxy for liquidity-motivated traders and
s
it
2 is a proxy for information-motivated traders. To jointly test the empirical relevance of the 
state space model and the role of informed and liquidity traders in functionality and the 
efficiency of financial markets, we employ multivariate regressions as motivated in the next 
section. 
  
3.4  A joint test of the empirical relevance of the state space model and the impact of 
different types of trading volume on price volatility, liquidity and market toxicity. 
As already noted, we employ a state space approach to decompose trading volume into 
expected and unexpected components, and argue that the expected component is mainly driven 
by liquidity-motivated traders and the unexpected component is primarily driven by 
                                                      
10 The results of the one-minute estimation results are presented in Appendix A and are qualitatively similar to the 
one-second interval estimations. 
17 
 
information-motivated traders. In order to jointly test the empirical relevance of the state space 
model and the role of liquidity and informed traders on the functioning and efficiency of 
financial markets, we employ predictive multivariate regressions. 
Kyle (1985) develops a theoretical model deriving equilibrium security prices when 
traders’ information sets are asymmetric. The model predicts that price volatility depends only 
on the informed trading volume and is independent of liquidity-based trading volume. In an 
associated work, Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016) extend and generalize Kyle's (1985) model 
and show that the informed trading-induced price volatility depends on the aggressiveness of 
informed traders.  
Thus, motivated by the predictions of the above-mentioned theoretical models, we 
jointly test the empirical relevance of the state space model and the roles of informed and 
liquidity traders in inducing price volatility by estimating the following regression: 






14131211                        
(4) 
where  tip , is the absolute value of price changes for stock i at time t, 1, tiEspread is the 
effective spread, measured as twice the absolute value of the difference between the last 
transaction price at time t-1 minus the prevailing bid-ask spread at the transaction time, for stock 
i at time t-1, 1, tiCTV is the percentage changes in trading volume for stock i at time t-1, 1, tiBSI




is the proxy for informed trading volume for stock i at time t-1 and U
it
2
1 is the proxy for liquidity 
trading volume for stock i at time t-1; both variables are obtained by maximum likelihood and 
from the state space estimation described in Section 3.3. The model is estimated at one-second 
intervals. Consistent with literature, we use absolute price changes to measure price volatility 
and employ effective spread for controlling liquidity. As mentioned, we use percentage 
changes in trading volume as the observable variable in the state space model. It implies that 
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our proxies for informed and liquidity traders are mechanically correlated with percentage 
changes in trading volume. Chordia et al. (2002) argue that prices and liquidity in financial 
markets are strongly affected by the difference between buyer- and seller-initiated trades. 
Therefore, we use the absolute difference between buyer- and seller-initiated trades as the 
additional proxy to control for the effect of trading volume, in addition to percentage change 







1  are the most important variables in the regression. If indeed 
our state space model correctly decomposes trading volume into liquidity and informed traders, 
we expect to see an insignificant relationship between U
it
2
1 and price volatility after controlling 




1  on the other hand should be negatively and significantly correlated with price 
volatility, due to the absence of excessive aggressiveness in our sample period (see Collin-
Dufresne & Fos 2016). As noted, we employ the absolute price changes as the dependent 
variable in the main regression, and for robustness, we also use the standard deviation of stock 
returns to measure price volatility (see as an example Lamoureux & Lastrapes 1990). 
Consistent with literature, we include the lagged value of the standard deviation of stock returns 
as an additional explanatory variable. 









1514131211                  (5) 
Glosten and Milgrom's (1985) model is based on the idea that the extent of the adverse 
selection problem facing specialists when they trade with informed traders is one of the factors 
that the bid-ask spread is influenced by. The model predicts that the bid-ask spread is positively 
correlated with informed traders, however it is independent of the liquidity traders. This model 
is based on the assumption that traders adopt their trading strategies by using market orders, 
i.e. they trade aggressively. However, Kaniel and Liu (2006) modify the Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) model and show that the informed traders with long-lived information tend to use limit 
orders rather than market orders (see also Menkveld 2013). It implies that by submitting limit 
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orders, informed traders might improve liquidity. In addition, the theoretical model presented 
by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) shows that informed traders who observe the same signal will 
compete against each other in exploiting the information signal, and this may lead to the market 
maker facing a smaller adverse selection problem. When faced with reduced adverse selection, 
market markets will respond with tighter spreads. Hence, motivated by the predictions of 
above-mentioned theoretical models, we jointly test the empirical relevance of the state space 
model and the role of informed and liquidity traders in liquidity by using the following 
regression: 
         ititititit
p
itit




14131211                          (6) 
where tiSpread , corresponds to one of relative spread, quoted spread and effective bid-ask 
spread. Quoted spread is the difference between the last ask price minus the last bid price at 
time t, while the relative spread is the quoted spread divided by the last mid-point at time t.  
p
it 1 is the standard deviation of stock returns, 1, tiCTV is the percentage changes in trading 
volume, 1, tiBSI is the absolute difference between buyer- and seller-initiated traders, Sit
2
1 is 
the proxy for informed traders, and U
it
2
1 is the proxy for liquidity traders. We employ one-
second frequency for the regression; t indexes the one-second interval. Additional explanatory 
variables, 1, tiCTV , 1, tiBSI and
p








1  are the key variables in our model. If indeed our state space model correctly 




1 and the various bid-ask spread metrics we use as dependent variables 
after controlling for volume, since Glosten and Milgrom (1985) argue that the bid-ask spread 
is not affected by the liquidity traders. By contrast, S
it
2
1  should be significantly and negatively 
related with the bid-ask spread variables, because informed trading induces adverse selection, 
20 
 




1  and the spread is expected also because there is no evidence of 
excessive aggressiveness in our sample period (see Menkveld 2013; Collin-Dufresne & Fos 
2015, 2016). 
 Finally, we investigate the role the informed trader plays in the creation of a toxic 
trading environment in the market. This is because the relationship between informed trading 
and market toxicity is a flipside question of the impact of informed traders on the functionality 
and efficiency of financial markets. In other words, questions about the role of informed traders 
in the inducement of market efficiency and the impact of informed traders on market toxicity 
are natural extensions of each other and one may not be fully explored without the other. Thus, 
we employ the following model to examine the relationship between market toxicity and 
informed trading: 
             
ititititititit





                              (7) 
where itMT is the proxy for market toxicity, 1, tiEspread is the effective spread, 1, tiCTV is the 








1 is the proxy for liquidity 
traders, as computed from the state space model. We use the nominal order imbalance (OIB#) 
developed by Chordia et al. (2008), which captures buying and selling pressure, as proxy for 
order flow toxicity; the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is used to classify trading volume into 
buys and sells. Thus, itMT is calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the 
numbers of buy and sell trades, divided by the total number of trades: 








                                                        (8) 
Apart from these, we again employ some additional explanatory variables ( 1, tiEspread
and 1, tiCTV ( 1, tiBSI )) to control for trading volume and liquidity. In a departure from the other 
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models already presented, we estimate this model only at the one-minute frequency. This is 
because it is difficult to obtain enough trading volume to compute itMT within the one second 
period in an unbiased manner. According to Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016) and Kaniel and 
Liu (2006), informed traders strategically choose to trade more when noise trading volume is 
high, and execute their trading strategies by submitting limit orders (passive orders) (see also 
Menkveld 2013), which leads to a negative relationship between informed trading volume and 
market toxicity during normal trading sessions (see also Admati & Pfleiderer 1988). Thus, we 
expect to see a negative correlation between S
it
2
1 and market toxicity (see also Collin-Dufresne 
& Fos 2015). 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE  
 Table 3 presents a correlation matrix with all the variables featured in the above-
presented models. The low correlation coefficient estimates among the variables (except for 
the liquidity proxies, which is expected) suggest that we do not have multicollinearity issues 
with the regression models. 
  
3.5 The predictability of short-horizon returns from unexpected (information-driven) 
components of trading volume 
According to Fama (1970), (developed) financial markets are largely informationally 
efficient over a daily horizon. Chordia et al. (2008) argue that although markets are quite 
efficient over a long-horizon, there are inefficiencies in markets at shorter horizons because 
traders need time to act on new information. Motivated by this, Chordia et al. (2008) examine 
the predictability of short-term returns from past order imbalance and document that, indeed, 
markets are inefficient over short periods. The study employs order imbalance as an 
explanatory variable because it is argued that order imbalance signals private information, due 
to its capturing of buying and selling pressure. In their model, Chordia et al. (2008) show that 
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short horizon returns predictability is smaller when markets are more liquid. We contend that 
the elimination of short horizon predictability is driven by the information-driven component 
of the order flow rather than increased order flow as a whole. Thus, we expect our estimated 
information-driven component of trading volume to be negatively correlated with short-
horizon returns. This is because informed trading eliminates arbitrage opportunities, and by so 
doing engenders a market where short-horizon returns are minimal. In addition to eliminating 
short horizon return predictability, informed trading decreases price volatility as long as there 
is no case of excessive aggressiveness in financial markets. Therefore, the risk premium 
demanded by the traders should decrease with the volume of information-motivated traders in 
the market (see Wang 1993). This regression also serves as a further test of the empirical 
relevance of the state space modelling approach to estimating liquidity and informed trading 
components of trading volume.  The estimated model is as follows: 
          
itititititit
SBSICTVEspreadR   
2
14131211
                                        (9) 
where itR is a midpoint return, 1, tiEspread is the effective spread, 1, tiCTV is the percentage 




1 is the proxy for informed traders. t indexes the one-second interval. 
1, tiEspread  and 1, tiCTV ( 1, tiBSI ) are included for control of liquidity and trading volume, 
respectively. All variables are computed over a one-second frequency. S
it
2
1 is the most 
important variable in this regression; we expect to see a significant and negative relationship 
between informed traders and future short-horizon return.  
While we estimate the above regression over one-second intervals, it could be insightful 
to also do so over a lower frequency, such as the one-minute interval. The reason for this is that 
the trading volume in our sample appears to be mainly driven by HFTs, given the sample period 
and market we focus on (see Brogaard et al. 2014). Thus, if HFTs constitute the bulk of the 
informed trading volume, the predictability of return should be greatly diminished over a one-
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minute interval, since a one-minute interval cannot be considered a short-horizon for an HFT-
driven market. Thus, we estimate the following regression at a one-minute frequency; the only 
difference to Equation (9) is the addition of itMT , which we can only validly compute at a 
minimum frequency of one-minute: 
                    
ititititititit MTBSICTVEspreadR
S    15
2
14131211
                     (10) 
 We expect that both itMT and Sit
2
1 should be insignificant at the one-minute interval 
because of the superfast trading systems of HFTs trading in S&P 500 stocks. 
  
4. Results and discussion  
4.1 State Space Estimates  
Before presenting the results of the joint test of the empirical relevance of the state 
space model and the role of liquidity and informed traders on the functioning and efficiency of 
financial markets, we report the estimates of the general state space model as presented in 
Equations (1) – (3). 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE  
Table 4 presents the standard deviation estimates of the expected (liquidity-driven) and 
unexpected (information-driven) components of trading volume as decomposed using the state 
space model. As expected, the standard deviation of the unexpected component is higher than 
the standard deviation of the expected component. The estimates for the unexpected 
component’s standard deviation in each quartile is higher than the corresponding estimates for 
the expected component. There are at still two reasons for this distribution in the estimates. 
Firstly, consistent with the structure of our state space approach, informed trades are more 
informative than the liquidity trades. Secondly, some liquidity traders (market makers) should 
trade consistently as they are under obligations to provide liquidity in the markets. By contrast, 
informed traders are not obligated to provide liquidity in the markets, and hence they are likely 
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to trade only if they have an informational advantage over other traders. It implies a higher 
variance for informed traders and our results are consistent with this expectation.  
Informed traders strategically trade more actively when trading volume and liquidity 
trading is high, as a higher trading volume provides a greater “camouflage” for informed trades. 
The estimates presented in Table 4 are consistent with this widely-held view in the market 
microstructure literature. For clarity, we divide our sample into quartiles according to their 
level of trading activity/activeness. The stocks in Quartile 1 are the least active ones, whereas 
Quartile 4 contains the most active stocks. The average daily trading volume estimates for 
Quartile 4 is 13.76 million, whereas the average daily trading volume estimates for Quartile 1 
is 1.59 million for the least active stocks; thus, the trading volume estimates in Quartile 4 is 
about nine times higher than the trading volume for the typical stock in Quartile 1. 
Correspondingly, the average daily standard deviation of liquidity-motivated trades in Quartile 
4 is about 9 times higher than the average daily standard deviation of liquidity traders in 
Quartile 1. This suggests that informed traders should be more active in Quartile 4; the 
estimates in the penultimate row of Table 4 are completely in line with this expectation; the 
average daily standard deviation of the unexpected component in Quartile 4 (14) is about 7 
times larger than that of the unexpected component at 1.99 in Quartile 1.  
   
4.2  Joint tests: the empirical relevance of the state space model and the impact of informed 
and liquidity trading volume on price volatility, liquidity and market toxicity. 
In order to jointly test the relevance of the state space estimates obtained above and to 
investigate the impact of liquidity and informed trading volume components on several market 
quality proxies, we estimate the predictive regressions shown in Equations (4) – (7); the 
regression estimates for the first market quality proxy (volatility – Equations 4 and 5) are now 
presented in Table 5.   
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE  
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The estimates show that the lagged unexpected (information-driven) component of 
trading volume is a significant predictor of one-second absolute price changes. In contrast, the 
liquidity/expected component is not a significant predictor of one-second absolute price 
changes once we control for volume and liquidity. This is unsurprising since the latter 
component is liquidity driven and it is ‘expected’ in the sense that the trading activity 
generating it is based on information already incorporated into the price of the traded financial 
instruments. The results hold for both measures of price volatility that we employ, i.e. absolute 
price changes (presented in Panel A) and standard deviation of stock returns (Panel B), 
although the unexpected component coefficient is larger in Panel A. The negative coefficient 
indicates that increases in information-motivated trades reduces price volatility in financial 
markets. This result is consistent with the result of the empirical study of Avramov et al. (2006), 
who find that stock price volatility is negatively correlated with informed traders. The 
significant unexpected component and the insignificant expected component estimates imply 
a validation of the empirical relevance of our state space approach to decomposing trading 
volume into informed and liquidity-drive components. As predicted by Kyle's (1985) model, 
the informed trading volume captured by our state space approach is significantly related to 
price volatility, however, liquidity trading component is not. The estimated coefficients for all 
the other explanatory variables are consistent with the existing literature; trading volume and 
the effective spread are both positively and significantly correlated with price volatility (see 
Epps & Epps 1976; Glosten & Milgrom 1985). The explanatory power of the regression is 
small, however, with the R2 being only about 0.33% for absolute price changes and 0.88% for 
standard deviation of stock returns. This is unsurprising and is due to our employment of a one-
second frequency for the models' estimations (see Chordia et al. 2008). 
The above-outlined results are consistent with the model presented by Collin-Dufresne 
and Fos (2016). The relationship between informed trading and price volatility is subject to 
two impacts. Firstly, informed traders’ activity in the market leads to the revelation of 
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information and this new information reduces price uncertainty in financial markets. The 
reduction in price uncertainty in turn spurs a reduction in price volatility. Secondly, informed 
traders may trade aggressively in a liquidity-constrained environment and thereby increase 
aggressiveness in financial markets and this may increase price volatility. Thus, the relationship 
between informed traders and price volatility depends on the aggressiveness of informed 
traders. The relationship will be positive if informed traders use aggressive orders (market 
orders) and create excessive aggressiveness in the market. Interestingly, in related papers, 
Menkveld (2013) and Rzayev and Ibikunle (2017) show that aggressive orders are not 
profitable during normal trading periods, i.e. if there is no extreme volatility in financial 
markets, then the use of market orders offers no trading advantage to informed traders. The 
implication here is that informed traders seldom submit aggressive orders during normal 
trading days. Hence, as we do not observe any instance of excessive aggressiveness in our 
sample for the period we focus on, the negative impact of informed trading on stock price 
volatility reported in Table 5 is what we would expect to find (see also Wang 1993).   
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE  
 We now turn to the relationship between liquidity and the decomposed trading volume 
components, and estimate Equation (6) for this purpose. In Table 6 we present the model’s 
estimates, and Panels A, B and C show the results with relative, quoted and effective spread 
measures as respective proxies for liquidity. The estimates show that, consistent with the 
predictions of Glosten and Milgrom's (1985) model predictions, the lagged unexpected 
component is a significant predictor of liquidity. The estimates for the lagged unexpected 
component of trading volume are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
irrespective of which liquidity proxy we employ. By contrast, the expected component is not 
significantly related with bid-ask spread after controlling for volume. The results in all of Table 
6’s panels indicate that the state space model we employ in this study appropriately 
decomposes trading volume into liquidity- and information-driven components. Consistent 
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with the results in Table 5, our results show that the information-driven component is 
negatively (positively) correlated with the bid-ask spread (liquidity). Negative coefficients 
indicate that informed traders are more likely to consume liquidity in financial markets rather 
than provide it; in this case, they are liquidity consumers. The results are consistent with the 
findings of Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015). The coefficients of all control variables are in line 
with the consistent literature. Similar to the price volatility model, R2 values in Panels A, B and 
C are very small at only 0.51%, 0.23% and 0.15% respectively, because of the estimation 
frequency we use, i.e. the one-second frequency.  
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE  
Finally, in this section, we examine the predictive regression estimates based on an 
investigation of the impact of liquidity and informed traders on market toxicity (as shown in 
Equation 7). Table 7 presents the estimated coefficients. Consistent with the results in Tables 
5 and 6, the lagged unexpected component of trading volume is negatively and significantly 
correlated with market toxicity, however the expected component is not, after we control for 
volume and liquidity. The negative correlation suggests that information-motivated trading 
volume reduces order flow toxicity in financial markets even after controlling for the overall 
impact of trading volume and liquidity. At least two mechanisms could explain this observed 
effect. Firstly, theoretical models like Glosten and Milgrom (1985) assume that informed 
traders use aggressive orders (market orders) to execute their trading strategies, and hence they 
increase the bid-ask spread and induce adverse selection risk/market toxicity. However, Kaniel 
and Liu (2006) modify Glosten and Milgrom's (1985) model and show that informed traders 
with long-loved information tend to use limit orders rather than market orders during normal 
trading periods (see also Menkveld 2013). The prediction of Kaniel and Liu's (2006) model is 
empirically confirmed by Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015). Thus, informed traders might use 
limit orders, which contributes to a reduction of the bid-ask spread by removing uncertainty in 
instruments’ prices, as long as the trading period is not unnecessarily aggressive. In addition, 
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the theoretical model presented by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) shows that informed traders 
who observe the same signal will compete against each other in exploiting the information 
signal, and this may lead to the market maker facing a smaller adverse selection problem. When 
faced with reduced adverse selection, market makers will respond with tighter spreads.  
Although all other control variables are significant in model, the explanatory power of 
the regression is small with the R2 being only about 0.07%, again owing to the short horizon 
over which we estimate Equation (7). 
  
4.3 The predictability of short-horizon return using the information-driven component of 
trading volume 
In the previous section, we show that the unexpected (information-driven) component 
obtained from our state space model is significantly correlated with future price volatility, 
liquidity and market toxicity. The expected (liquidity-driven) component, on the other hand, is 
not significantly correlated with future volatility, liquidity and toxicity after controlling for 
volume, and in the case of volatility and toxicity, after controlling for liquidity. These results 
are consistent with the predictions of the Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) models 
and offer a strong support to our argument that the state space approach correctly decomposes 
trading volume into liquidity- and information-motivated trades. In other words, these results 
show that the unexpected component, as estimated, signals private information. Chordia et al. 
(2002) and Chordia et al. (2008) argue that short-horizon return can be predicted by order 
imbalance, as order imbalance can signal private information, and they show this empirically 
by estimating a series of short-horizon predictive regressions. Thus, if indeed the unexpected 
component signals private information, then stock returns should be predictable by the 
unexpected component as well. We employ one-second and one-minute frequency to 
empirically test the predictive power of the lagged unexpected component of trading volume 
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for one-second and one-minute price returns respectively. As explained, we believe that 
although stock returns might be predictable within the one-second horizon in a market 
dominated by HFTs, such predictability dissipates over a longer horizon, such as one-minute, 
due to the ability of HFTs to eliminate arbitrage opportunities at much lower frequencies. 
We first estimate the predictive regression Equation (9) at one-second intervals.  
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE  
Table 8 presents the estimated coefficients for Equation (9). All of the coefficients, 
including the unexpected component variable, are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
Consistent with estimates from the previous section, the unexpected component estimate is also 
negative, suggesting that increasing levels of informed trading volumes eliminates 
returns/arbitrage.  Thus, the unexpected component of trading volume as obtained using the 
state space model approach signals private information similar to the order imbalance metrics 
developed by Chordia et al. (2008). The adjusted R2 is 0.02%, due to the frequency of the 
estimated model – one-second intervals.  
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE  
We next estimate a similar regression model (Equation 10) over a longer time horizon 
of one-minute. As expected, the unexpected component is not significant after controlling for 
volume and liquidity, and the adjusted R2 coefficient is 0.06% for this model. The lack of 
statistical significance for the unexpected component in the one-minute frequency regression 
model is due to the prevalence of HFT activity in the data we use, and the ability of HFTs to 
eliminate arbitrage opportunities at much lower frequencies. We also include the order 
imbalance metric used by Chordia et al. (2008) in the regression model and, in contrast to 
Chordia et al. (2008)’s results, the measure is not significant here. This shows that while one-
second stock return is predictable from lagged metrics that signal private information, one-
minute stock returns are not predictable in financial markets dominated by HFTs. 
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A key finding here is that although the lag of the unexpected component predicts one-
second stock returns, one-minute stock returns are not predictable using either the unexpected 
component or order imbalance (as computed by Chordia et al. 2008). Thus, the latter part of 
the findings are not consistent with the results presented by Chordia et al. (2008) as Chordia et 
al. (2008) show that even five-minute stock returns can be predicted from past order imbalance. 
The inconsistency here is linked to the data period employed by both studies. While Chordia 
et al. (2008) employ a dataset covering 1993 to 2002, when HFTs are not the main drivers of 
trading in financial markets, we employ a much more recent dataset from 2016 to 2017. For 
example, based on an analysis of similar data, which is older than ours by a few years, Brogaard 
et al. (2014) show that at least fifty percent of New York’s trading volume is driven by HFTs. 
It implies that the speed of price adjustment through the incorporation of new information has 
become much lower. Specifically, HFTs do not need a full minute to absorb and act on new 
information. Furthermore, Brogaard et al. (2014) show that HFTs are more active in large 
stocks. As our sample consists of the most active and largest stocks in U.S. financial markets, 
we expect that HFTs are the dominant traders in our sample period. Thus, the definition of 
short-horizon has shifted since the period investigated by Chordia et al. (2008); the one or five-
minute (as in the case of Chordia et al. 2008) horizons cannot be considered as short-horizons 
for the purpose of predicting short-horizon returns. The negative relationship between the 
unexpected component and the one-second short-horizon return documented above is due to a 
decrease in the risk premium demanded by the traders when informed trading reduces volatility 
in the absence of excessive aggressiveness in the market. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we develop a state space model for decomposing trading volume into 
liquidity-driven (expected) and information-driven (unexpected) components. We find 
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evidence of the empirical relevance of our approach to estimating liquidity and information-
driven components of trading volume. This paper is based on two central arguments related to 
the specification of the state space approach we use. Firstly, we argue that the expected 
component we obtain from the state space model is mainly driven by liquidity-seeking order 
flow, and secondly, that the unexpected component as motivated is primarily driven by 
information-motivated order flow. In addition to providing a robust set of arguments to back 
up our claims, we further develop a set of multivariate regression models to formally test these 
arguments. We find that the unexpected component obtained from the state space model is 
significantly correlated to lead volatility, liquidity and toxicity, even after controlling for 
volume (and in the case of volatility and toxicity, we also control for liquidity), whereas the 
expected component is not significantly related with them once volume and liquidity are 
controlled for. These results are consistent with the theoretical models presented in Kyle (1985) 
and Glosten and Milgrom (1985); the consistency therefore implies that the expected and 
unexpected components can be viewed as encapsulating the liquidity- and information-
motivated trades in our sample, respectively. The findings can also be linked to informed 
traders not trading by using market (aggressive) orders during normal trading periods, when 
there are no upheavals or extreme liquidity constraints in the market, as predicted by Kaniel 
and Liu (2006) and Menkveld (2013).  
Furthermore, we demonstrate that, similar to the order imbalance metrics developed by 
Chordia et al. (2008), the unexpected component we compute is also a significant predictor of 
short-horizon returns. This again shows that the unexpected component signals private 
information, which is due to its capturing information-motivated trading volume. The 
estimated and statistically significant negative relationship between the lag unexpected 
component of trading volume (informed trading) and one-second short-horizon return is linked 
to a reduction in the risk premium demanded by the traders, given that increased informed 
trading is linked with a reduction in price volatility during normal trading period, i.e. in the 
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absence of excessive aggressiveness in trading. However, in contrast to Chordia et al. (2008), 
we find that one-minute return cannot be predicted using either the unexpected component 
metric or order imbalance, as employed by Chordia et al. (2008) for a five-minute return. This 
implies that in today’s high frequency trading environment, arbitrage opportunities are 
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Table 1. Summary of trading activities 
The table presents trading summary statistics for the most active 100 S&P 500 stocks from September 
1, 2016 through to October 30, 2017. The Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is used to classify trades as 
buyer- and seller-initiated.  
 
 
Buyer-initiated               
(000,000s)  










Total trading volume 
(00,000,000s) 




Seller-initiated  Average trade sizes 
 






Total USD volume 
($'0,000,000,000) 


























Table 2. Summary statistics for variables 
The table presents the descriptive statistics for variables of interest. Espread is the effective spread, computed as 
twice the absolute value of the difference between the last execution price for each interval and the midpoint of 
the prevailing bid and ask prices. Rspread is the relative spread, and is obtained by dividing the difference between 
the best ask and bid prices for each interval by the midpoint of both prices. Qspread is the quoted spread, and is 
simply the difference between the best ask and bid prices for each interval. CTV is the percentage change in trading 
volume, BSI is the absolute difference between buyer- and seller-initiated traders, |Δp| is absolute value of price 
change, R is the one-second midpoint return, σp is the standard deviation of mid-price returns, and MT is the proxy 
for market toxicity, calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the numbers of buy and sell trades. 
One-second frequency is used for all variables, except MT. MT is computed by using one-minute frequency. The 
sample contains the most active 100 S&P 500 stocks traded between September 1, 2016 through to October 30, 
2017 on NYSE and NASDAQ. 
 
 
Variables Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Espread  0.00906 0.01000 0.04625 
Rspread  0.00039 0.00028 0.00090 
Qspread  0.01863 0.01000 0.05640 
CTV  28.218 1.00 1026 
BSI  1584.05 424.00 35771 
p  0.00918 0.00900 0.06707 
R  -0.412x10-6 0.00 0.00139 
σp 0.92x10-4 0.59x10-4 0.00091 








Table 3. Correlation matrix for variables 
The table plots the correlation matrix of the variables employed in this study’s models. Espread is the effective spread, computed as twice the absolute value of the difference 
between the last execution price for each interval and the midpoint of the prevailing bid and ask prices. Rspread is the relative spread, and is obtained by dividing the difference 
between the best ask and bid prices for each interval by the midpoint of both prices. Qspread is the quoted spread, and is simply the difference between the best ask and bid prices 
for each interval. CTV is the percentage change in trading volume, BSI is the absolute difference between buyer- and seller-initiated traders, |Δp| is absolute value of price change, 
σp is the standard deviation of mid-price returns, and S2  and U2 are the state space model-estimated proxies for informed and liquidity trading volumes respectively. The sample 
contains the most active 100 S&P 500 stocks traded between September 1, 2016 through to October 30, 2017 on NYSE and NASDAQ. 
 
 
 Qspread  Rspread  Espread  CTV  BSI  S2  U
2  p  
p
  
Qspread  1         
Rspread  0.80004 1        
Espread  0.91242 0.72760 1       
CTV  0.00059 0.00499 0.00126 1      
BSI  0.00031 0.00914 0.00392 0.12078 1     
S2  
0.00010 0.00023 0.00050 0.21591 0.09836 1    
U2  
0.00007 0.00002 0.00004 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 1   
p  0.08367 0.05412 0.06475 0.00134 0.00698 0.00002 0.00008 1  










Table 4. State Space Estimates 
The table contains trading volume statistics and average daily standard deviation estimates of unexpected 
(information-driven) and expected (liquidity-driven) components of trading volume for the most active 100 S&P 
500 stocks trading between September 1, 2016 through to October 30, 2017. Stocks are divided into quartiles 
according to their level of trading activity. Quartile 1 contains the least active companies, while Quartile 4 contains 
the most active stocks. The estimates are based on the following state space model for decomposing percentage 
change in trading volume: 
ititit smv 
; 















corresponds to trading volume of stock i at time t and 
1itTVolume
 is 
trading volume of stock i at time t-1, itm is a non-stationary expected component of stock i at time t, its  is a 
stationary unexpected component for stock i at time t and itu is an idiosyncratic disturbance error. TV in the table 
below is the average daily trading volume, while σsit and σuit are the standard deviation estimates of the unexpected 
and expected components of trading volume respectively, estimated by maximum likelihood (constructed using 
the Kalman filter). 
 
 Quartiles 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
Trading volume 
(‘000,000) 
1.59 2 3.02 13.76 
σsit 1.99 3.34 5.25 14.00 





























Table 5. Predictive power of lagged expected and unexpected components of trading 
volume on market volatility 
The predictive power of one-second expected and unexpected components of trading volume is estimated using 


















where |Δp| is the absolute value of price change, Espread is the effective spread, computed as twice the absolute 
value of the difference between the last execution price for each interval and the midpoint of the prevailing bid 
and ask prices. p
it 1 is the standard deviation of stock returns, CTV is the percentage changes in trading volume, 
BSI is the absolute difference between buyer- and seller-initiated traders, S
it
2




1  are the state space model-
based proxies (estimated using Kalman filter constructed maximum likelihood) for informed and uninformed 
trading. The sample contains the most active 100 S&P 500 stocks traded between September 1, 2016 through to 
October 30, 2017 on NYSE and NASDAQ. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 





 Coefficient  t-Statistics 
Intercept  0.844x10-2***  707.48 
1, tiEspread  0.724x10
-1***  287.01 
1, tiCTV  0.123x10
-6***  18.95 
1, tiBSI  0.543x10










0.195x10-44  0.90 






 Coefficient  t-Statistics 
Intercept  0.754x10-4***  464.92 
p
it 1  
0.382x10-2***  50.93 
1, tiEspread  0.158x10
-2***  460.13 
1, tiCTV  0.147x10
-8***  16.59 
1, tiBSI  0.125x10










-48  0.02 




Table 6. Predictive power of lagged expected and unexpected components of trading 
volume on market liquidity 











where Spread corresponds to one of effective, quoted and relative spreads respectively. Effective spread is 
computed as twice the absolute value of the difference between the last execution price for each interval and the 
midpoint of the prevailing bid and ask prices. Relative spread is obtained by dividing the difference between the 
best ask and bid prices for each interval by the midpoint of both prices. Quoted spread is simply the difference 
between the best ask and bid prices for each interval. p
it 1 is the standard deviation of stock returns, CTV is the 








1  are the state space model-based proxies (estimated using Kalman filter constructed 
maximum likelihood) for informed and uninformed trading. The sample contains the most active 100 S&P 500 
stocks traded between September 1, 2016 through to October 30, 2017 on NYSE and NASDAQ. ***, ** and * 
correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
Dependent Variable: tiRSpread ,  
 Coefficient  t-Statistics 
Intercept  0.390x10-3***  2475.95 
p
it 1  
0.194x10-1***  262.16 
1, tiCTV  0.661x10
-9***  7.56 
1, tiBSI  0.144x10










-0.832x10-47  -0.28 
Adjusted R2  0.0051  
 
Panel B 
Dependent Variable: tiQSpread ,  
 Coefficient  t-Statistics 
Intercept  0.185x10-1***  1872.84 
p
it 1  
0.936***  201.72 
1, tiCTV  0.961x10
-8*  1.75 
1, tiBSI  0.527x10










-46  0.03 




Dependent Variable: tiESpread ,  
42 
 
 Coefficient  t-Statistics 
Intercept  0.896x10-2***  1105.90 
p
it 1  
0.626***  164.50 
1, tiCTV  -0.305x10
-8  -0.68 
1, tiBSI  0.349x10










-0.293x10-45  -0.19 



































Table 7. Predictive power of lagged expected and unexpected components of trading 
volume on market toxicity 
The predictive power of one-minute expected and unexpected components of trading volume is estimated using 
the following model: 
ititititititit






where MT is a proxy for market toxicity, which is computed as the absolute value of the difference between the 
numbers of buy and sell trades over a one-minute interval, divided by the total number of trades for that interval. 
Espread is the effective spread, computed as twice the absolute value of the difference between the last execution 
price for each one-minute interval and the midpoint of the prevailing bid and ask prices. CTV is the percentage 







1  are the state space model-based proxies (estimated using Kalman filter constructed maximum likelihood) 
for informed and uninformed trading. The sample contains the most active 100 S&P 500 stocks traded between 
September 1, 2016 through to October 30, 2017 on NYSE and NASDAQ. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: itMT  
 Coefficient  t-Statistics 
Intercept  0.539***  4664.09 
1, tiEspread  0.769x10
-1***  57.41 
1, tiCTV  0.137x10
-5***  9.62 
1, tiBSI  0.877x10










0.113x10-43  1.02 
























Table 8. Predictive power of lagged unexpected component of trading volume on one-
second stock returns 
The predictive power of one-second expected and unexpected components of trading volume is estimated using 
the following model: 
itititititit




where R is the midpoint one-second return, Espread is the relative spread, computed as twice the absolute value 
of the difference between the last execution price for each one-second interval and the midpoint of the prevailing 
bid and ask prices. CTV is the percentage changes in trading volume, BSI is the absolute difference between buyer- 
and seller-initiated traders, and S
it
2
1 is the state space model-based proxy (estimated using Kalman filter 
constructed maximum likelihood) for informed trading. The sample contains the most active 100 S&P 500 stocks 
traded between September 1, 2016 through to October 30, 2017 on NYSE and NASDAQ. ***, ** and * 
correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: itR  
 Coefficient  t-Statistics 
Intercept  -0.444x10-5***  -17.96 
1, tiEspread  0.390x10
-3***  74.48 
1, tiCTV  0.129x10
-8***  9.61 
1, tiBSI  0.316x10





-0.581x10-15***  -3.57 



























Table 9. Predictive regressions of one-minute returns on lagged unexpected component 
The predictive power of one-minute expected and unexpected components of trading volume is estimated using 
the following model: 
ititititititit MTBSICTVEspreadR




where R is the midpoint one-minute return, Espread is the relative spread, computed as twice the absolute value 
of the difference between the last execution price for each one-minute interval and the midpoint of the prevailing 
bid and ask prices. CTV is the percentage changes in trading volume, BSI is the absolute difference between buyer- 
and seller-initiated traders. MT is a proxy for market toxicity, which is computed as the absolute value of the 
difference between the numbers of buy and sell trades over a one-minute interval, divided by the total number of 
trades for that interval, and S
it
2
1 is the state space model-based proxy (estimated using Kalman filter constructed 
maximum likelihood) for informed trading. The sample contains the most active 100 S&P 500 stocks traded 
between September 1, 2016 through to October 30, 2017 on NYSE and NASDAQ. ***, ** and * correspond to 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: itR  
 Coefficient  t-Statistics 
Intercept  -0.707x10-5***  -3.02 
1, tiEspread  0.867x10
-3***  59.39 
1, tiCTV  0.677x10
-8***  4.36 
1, tiBSI  0.781x10





0.223x10-15  1.48 
itMT  -0.184x10
-5  -0.50 























Appendix A. Predictive power of lagged expected and unexpected components of trading 
volume on market volatility and liquidity II 
The predictive power of one-minute expected and unexpected components of trading volume is estimated using 
















where |Δp| is the absolute value of price change, Espread is the effective spread, computed as twice the absolute 
value of the difference between the last execution price for each interval and the midpoint of the prevailing bid 
and ask prices, Rspread is the relative spread and  is obtained by dividing the difference between the best ask and 
bid prices for each interval by the midpoint of both prices p
it 1 is the standard deviation of stock returns, CTV is 








1  are the state space model-based proxies (estimated using Kalman filter constructed 
maximum likelihood) for informed and uninformed trading. The sample contains the most active 100 S&P 500 
stocks traded between September 1, 2016 through to October 30, 2017 on NYSE and NASDAQ. ***, ** and * 
correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
Dependent Variable: tip ,  
 Coefficient  t-Statistics 
Intercept  0.200x10-1***  388.04 
1, tiEspread  0.460x10
-1***  76.75 
1, tiCTV  0.489x10
-6***  7.69 
1, tiBSI  0.775x10










-0.653x10-45  -0.13 
Adjusted R2  0.0019  
 
Panel B 
Dependent Variable: tiRSpread ,  
 Coefficient  t-Statistics 
Intercept  0.440x10-3***  824.36 
p
it 1  
0.203x10-3***  58.80 
1, tiCTV  0.251x10
-8***  3.82 
1, tiBSI  0.134x10










-47  0.05 




APPENDIX B. List of the sample stocks 
ISIN CODE RIC SECURITY NAME 
US02376R1023 AAL.OQ American Airlines Group Inc. 
US0378331005 AAPL.OQ Apple Inc. 
US00287Y1091 ABBV.N AbbVie Inc. 
US0028241000 ABT.N Abbott Laboratories 
US00130H1059 AES.N AES Corp. 
US0268747849 AIG.N American International Group Inc. 
US0382221051 AMAT.OQ Applied Materials Inc. 
US0079031078 AMD.OQ Advanced Micro Devices Inc. 
US0325111070 APC.N Anadarko Petroleum Corp. 
US00507V1098 ATVI.OQ Activision Blizzard Inc. 
US0605051046 BAC.N Bank of America Corp. 
US1101221083 BMY.N Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 
US1011371077 BSX.N Boston Scientific Corp. 
US1729674242 C.N Citigroup Inc. 
US1746101054 CFG.N Citizens Financial Group Inc. 
US1651671075 CHK.N Chesapeake Energy Corp. 
US20030N1019 CMCSA.OQ Comcast Corp. 
US1270971039 COG.N Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. 
US20825C1045 COP.N ConocoPhillips 
US2220702037 COTY.N Coty Inc. 
US17275R1023 CSCO.OQ Cisco Systems Inc. 
US1264081035 CSX.OQ CSX Corp. 
US1567001060 CTL.N CenturyLink Inc. 
US1266501006 CVS.N CVS Health Corp. 
US1667641005 CVX.N Chevron Corp. 
US2473617023 DAL.N Delta Air Lines Inc. 
US2546871060 DIS.N Walt Disney Co. 
US2786421030 EBAY.OQ eBay Inc. 
US2944291051 EFX.N Equifax Inc. 
US3453708600 F.N Ford Motor Co. 
US30303M1027 FB.OQ Facebook Inc. 
US35671D8570 FCX.N Freeport-McMoRan Inc. 
US3167731005 FITB.OQ Fifth Third Bancorp 
US90130A2006 FOXA.OQ Twenty-First Century Fox Inc. 
US3696041033 GE.N General Electric Co. 
US3700231034 GGP.N General Growth Properties Inc. 
US3755581036 GILD.OQ Gilead Sciences Inc. 
US2193501051 GLW.N Corning Inc. 
US37045V1008 GM.N General Motors Co. 
48 
 
US3647601083 GPS.N Gap Inc. 
US4062161017 HAL.N Halliburton Co. 
US4461501045 HBAN.OQ Huntington Bancshares Inc. 
US4103451021 HBI.N HanesBrands Inc. 
US42824C1099 HPE.N Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co. 
US4282361033 HPQ.N Hewlett-Packard Co. 
US44107P1049 HST.N Host Hotels & Resorts Inc. 
US4581401001 INTC.OQ Intel Corp. 
US4783661071 JCI.N Johnson Controls 
US4781601046 JNJ.N Johnson & Johnson International Plc. 
US46625H1005 JPM.N JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
US4932671088 KEY.N KeyCorp 
US49456B1017 KMI.N Kinder Morgan Inc. 
US1912161007 KO.N The Coca Cola Co. 
US5010441013 KR.N Kroger Co. 
US5486611073 LOW.N Lowe's Companies Inc. 
US8447411088 LUV.N Southwest Airlines Co. 
US55616P1049 M.N Macy's Inc. 
US5770811025 MAT.OQ Mattel Inc. 
US6092071058 MDLZ.OQ Mondelez International Inc. 
IE00BTN1Y115 MDT.N Medtronic Plc. 
US59156R1086 MET.N MetLife Inc. 
US5529531015  MGM.N MGM Resorts International 
US02209S1033 MO.N Altria Group Inc. 
US58933Y1055 MRK.N Merck & Co Inc. 
US5658491064 MRO.N Marathon Oil Corp. 
US6174464486 MS.N Morgan Stanley 
US5949181045 MSFT.OQ Microsoft Corp. 
US5951121038 MU.OQ Micron Technology Inc. 
NL0011031208 MYL.OQ Mylan NV Inc. 
US6516391066 NEM.N Newmont Mining Corp. 
US64110L1061 NFLX.OQ Netflix Inc. 
US6541061031 NKE.N Nike Inc. 
US6293775085 NRG.N NRG Energy Inc. 
US67066G1040 NVDA.OQ NVIDIA Corp. 
US68389X1054 ORCL.N Oracle Corp. 
US7170811035 PFE.N Pfizer Inc. 
US7427181091 PG.N Procter & Gamble Co. 
US70450Y1038 PYPL.OQ PayPal Holdings Inc. 
US7475251036 QCOM.OQ Qualcomm Inc. 
US7591EP1005 RF.N Regions Financial Corp. 
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US75281A1097 RRC.N Range Resources Corp. 
US8552441094 SBUX.OQ Starbucks Corp. 
US8085131055 SCHW.N Charles Schwab Corp. 
AN8068571086 SLB.N Schlumberger NV 
IE00B58JVZ52 STX.OQ Seagate Technology Plc. 
US87165B1035 SYF.N Synchrony Financial 
US8715031089 SYMC.OQ Symantec Corp. 
US00206R1023 T.N AT&T Inc. 
US87612E1064 TGT.N Target Corp. 
US8825081040 TXN.OQ Texas Instruments Inc. 
US9043111072 UAA.N Under Armour Inc. 
US9029733048 USB.N U.S. Bancorp 
US92826C8394 V.N Visa Inc. 
US92553P2011 VIAB.OQ Viacom Inc. 
US92343V1044 VZ.N Verizon Communications Inc. 
US9314271084 WBA.OQ Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc. 
US9497461015 WFC.N Wells Fargo & Co. 
US9694571004 WMB.N Williams Companies Inc. 
US9311421039 WMT.N Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 
US30231G1022 XOM.N Exxon Mobil Corp. 
 
 
